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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 






. Case No. 18122 
FRANCIS EUGENE KNILL, . . 
Defendant-Appellant. . . 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with committing the crime of 
Theft in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-404 (1953), as 
amend en. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury which found him 
guilty of Theft on October 15, 1981 in the District Court in 
and for Emery County, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding. 
The court pronounced judgment at that time and sentenced 
appellant to imprisonment for a term of one to fifteen years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment and sentence rendered at the trial. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 25, 1981, a highway patrol sergeant noticed 
appellant driving down a hill at a high rate of speed (T. 50). 
The officer followed the car and called in the license plate 
number, which identified the plates as stolen (T. 52). A 
second officer appeared and the two officers then stopped 
appellant. Appellant's driver's license did not match the 
car's registration (T. 52) because the car was registered to 
Eric Wichgram (T. 58). An insurance card in the car also bore 
Wichgram's name (T. 58). 
The serial number found on the car door also nid not 
match the registration card (T. 56). Wichgram, the car's 
owner, had replaced the car doors and the serial number on the 
door belonged, of course, to the car from which the door was 
taken (T. 41). 
Despite the conflict in serial numbers, Wichgram 
proved ownership of the car through extensive testimony (T. 
37, 38). He had installed a custom stereo system (T. 40), 
replaced the seats (T. 40), and installed a clock, tachometer 
ano interior console. Also, he reported the car as stolen, 
using the correct serial number from the body of the vehicle 
(T. 43). 
The license plate on the stolen car did not belong 
to Wichgram. The plate had been stolen from a third party, 
-2-
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a relative of appellant's (T. 64, nS). The relative did not 
loan the plate to appellant and had, in fact, reported it as 
s to 1 e n ( T • 6 5-6 6 ) • 
Appellant claimed that he had traded a motorcycle 
for the car (T. 56); however, he did not produce a bill of 
sale, was unable to recall the alleged prior owner's last 
name, and did not attempt to use this story as a defense at 
trial. 
After counsel was appointed for appellant, he waived 
the preliminary hearing (R. 1). Appellant then hired his 
present attorney and moved that the case be remanded for a 
preliminary hearing (R. 4, R. 18). Appellant later requested 
that the case be transferred from the Justice of the Peace 
Court to the Circuit Court (R. 20). After these delays, 
caused by appellant, arraignment was set for October 6, 1981. 
Trial was nine days later. The jury found appellant guilty of 
theft. 
Appellant, prior to 1975, had been convicted of 
another felony (T. 86). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
FROM COUNSEL IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THESE 
PROCEEDINGS. 
Appellant's original counsel, Charles w. Taylor, was 
appointed to represent both appellant and his son. In Point 
-3-
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II of his brief, appellant now claims that this dual 
representation caused Mr. Taylor to be an ineffective 
advocate. 
Appellant claims that Mr. Taylor allegedly 
encouraged appellant to waive the preliminary hearing, plead 
guilty, and waive his right to confront witnesses and to trial 
by jury so that the charges against appellant's son would be 
droppe~. However, these contentions are not supported in the 
record. Appellant did waive the preliminary hearing {R. 8); 
however, even in appellant's own affidavit {R. 18), he does 
not claim that he intended to plead guilty. There is no 
support in the record for appellant's claim that he waived his 
right to confront witnesses or to be tried by a jury. In 
fact, appellant received a jury trial. Also, the record does 
not support appellant's claim that the charges against his son 
were dropped at all, let alone in exchanqe for appellant's 
waiver of the preliminary hearing. Therefore, despite 
appellant' assertions to the contrary, the only waiver 
appellant made was of his statutory right to a preliminary 
hearing, which he later received anyway. 
Although appellant retained his present counsel 
immediately after waiving the preliminary hearing, he first 
raises the issue of ineffective counsel on appeal. This Court 
has stated that it generally will not rule on issues raised 
for the first time on appeal. State v. Lee, Utah, 633 P.2d 
-4-
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48 (1981); State v. Hales, Utah, P.2d (Case No. 
18083, decided July 7, 1982). In this case, appellant could 
have raised this issue long before even the trial stage since 
he had new counsel for his preliminary hearing. 
In State v. McQueen, 14 Utah 2d 311, 383 P.2d 921, 
922 (1963), the defendant for the first time on appeal raised 
the issue of unlawful search, seizure and arrest. This Court 
stated: 
We cannot canvas any such issue on appeal 
here. The state had no opportunity to 
meet such issues, which were interjected 
for the first time on appeal. • . • It is 
obvious that to review such extraneous 
matter would be offensive to appellate 
practice and highly prejudicial to the 
opposition, who had no opportunity to meet 
it at the trial level (emphasis added). 
In the present case, if appellant had properly raised this 
issue at trial, the state could have examined witnesses to 
determine whether counsel was in fact ineffective in 
representing both parties. 
In State v. West, 2 Kan. App. 2d 297, 578 P.2d 287 
(1978), two brothers were represented at trial by the same 
attorney. One brother's defense was intoxication, but he 
could not testify about his condition without implicating the 
other brother. Since the brothers' defenses conflicted and 
they made timely motions for separate attorneys, the court 
held that the defendants were entitled to different attorneys. 
-5-
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In a similar case, the Supreme Court held that the defendants 
were entitled to separate counsel because their defenses 
conflicted, the evidence was weak against one defendant, and 
he had objected to dual representation at trial. Glasser v. 
United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). In both of these cases the 
defendants objected to dual representation, their defenses 
conflicted, and the problem occurred at trial. In the present 
case, the appellant did not object, did not show that his 
defense would have conflicted, and the representation occurred 
at the preliminary hearing stage. Also, the evidence against 
appellant was very strong (he was caught driving a stolen car) 
(T. 51, 55). 
This Court, in State v. Albert, Utah, 584 P.2d 843 
(1978), reasoned that when a defendant freely consented to the 
appointment of counsel and had time to consult with him before 
pleading guilty, he was not denied adequate counsel. In this 
case appellant freely consented to Mr. Taylor's appointment 
and had time to consult with him before waiving his 
preliminary hearing. 
In addition to the fact that appellant failed to 
timely raise this issue by objecting to the appointment, there 
is nothing in the record to support the claim of ineffective 
counsel. Appellant has the burden of showing how his counsel 
was ineffective and the proof must be a demonstrable reality, 
not mere speculation. State v. McNicol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203 
-6-
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(1976). Appellant must demonstrate that dual representation 
caused his attorney to be less effective. State v. Tippetts, 
Utah, 584 P.2d 892 (1978). Apparently, appellant's counsel 
is merely speculating that since appellant waived the 
preliminary hearing and his original counsel represented both 
appellant and his son, the original counsel must have been 
ineffective. The record does not reflect any inherent 
conflict or prejurlice to appellant's case. This Court has 
stated that " ••• we are not inclined to reverse a conviction 
on matters dehors the record." State v. Starlight Club, 17 
Utah 2o 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965). 
Even if appellant waived the preliminary hearing so 
that the charges against his son would be dropped, this does 
not prove that his attorney was ineffective. In People v. 
Duran, 498 P.2d 937 (Colo. 1972), the defendant entered a 
guilty plea so that the charges against his wife would be 
dropped. He was concerned about the effect on his five 
children and the possibility of losing custody of them if his 
wife were convicted. The court accepten the plea because it 
was not a result of deceit, enhancement or coercion. 
In a similar case, Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 
483 ~.2d 437 (1971), the defendant also pled guilty (as his 
attorney advised) so that the charges against his wife would 
be dropped. This Court did not find a conflict in dual 
representation when the defendant entered his plea. The 
present case is within the scope of these cases since the 
-7-
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defendants in those cases were pleading guilty while in the 
present case the appellant merely waived a preliminary 
hearing. Thus, "the mere fact of multiple representation, 
standing alone, does not amount to a conflict of interest." 
People v. Romero, 189 Col. 526, 543 P.2d 56 (1975). Even if 
appellant did waive his preliminary hearing to help his son, 
this fact alone does not establish that his counsel was 
ineffective. 
The fact that appellant waived the preliminary 
hearing is actually irrelevant to his claim of ineffective 
counsel because no plea can be given at that stage. A 
preliminary hearing is merely to oetermine whether there is 
sufficient evidence to hold the defendant. Crouch v. State, 
24 Utah 2o 126, 467 P.2d 43 (1970). In this case, the 
evidence was certainly sufficient to hold appellant since he 
was caught "red-handed." Therefore, whether appellant waived 
the hearing or not, the result woul~ have been the same--he 
woula be bound over to district court for arraignment. 
In McGuffey v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P.2d 166, 
167 (1967), this Court stated: 
It is rather difficult to see how a guilty 
defendant is prejudiced by waiving a 
preliminary hearing when all that is 
entailed at the hearing is that sufficient 
evidence be given to the committing 
magistrate to cause him to believe that a 
crime has been committed and that there is 
probable cause to believe the defendant is 
guilty thereof (emphasis added). 
-8-
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Similarly, in Seibold v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 165, 435 P.2d 289, 
290 (1967), this Court stated "Under our practice the 
preliminary hearing is not a critical stage of criminal 
procedure." See also: State v. Starratt, 153 N.W.2d 311 
(N.D. 1967). 
This Court, in State v. Gray, Utah, 601 P.2d 918, 
920 (1979), held that even if counsel was ineffective, the 
conviction should not be reversed unless a likelihood exists 
that different counsel would have caused a different result. 
This Court thouqht that the defendant did not ''establish 
anything more than mere speculation as to prejudice becaue of 
ineffectiveness of his counsel." Appellant's contention is 
also only speculation, and there is no likelihood that a 
different attorney would have caused a different result since 
appellant received a hearing anyway. 
This Court confronted the flaw in appellant's 
contention in State v. Sims, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313, 
1315 (1974): 
In regard to the defendant's contention 
that he was denied effective counsel: we 
are impelled to remark that it is nothing 
less than shameful that our law seems to 
have degenerated to a point where whenever 
an accused is convicted of a crime, the 
charge of incompetency of counsel is, with 
ever increasing frequency, leveled at 
capable attorneys who have given entirely 
adequate service, when the real difficulty 
was that he had a guilty client (emphasis 
added). 
-9-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED 
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS TO PRODUCE AND DISMISS 
SINCE THE REQUESTED EVIDENCE WAS 
UNNECESSARY IN THE DETEPMINATION OF 
APPELLANT'S GUILT. 
In Point V of his brief, appellant claims that the 
trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant's 
Motion to Produce. Appellant contends that he needed to 
examine the stolen automobile because, allegedly, a conflict 
existed in identification of the vehicle. A defendant has no 
right to examine the state's evidence unless required by 
statute. Mendelsohn v. People, 353 P.2d 587 (Colo. 1960). 
Indeed, in this case the car was not to be introduced as 
evidence at all by the state. The Supreme Court has stated 
"There is no general right to discovery in a criminal case. 
" Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). • • • 
In Utah, the Legislature has set forth discovery 
rules. Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-16(5) (1981 Supp.} provides 
that the court shall determine whether defendant is entitled 
to examine an item of evidence, based on defendant's showing 
that the evidence is needed to adequately prepare his defense. 
Thus, the trial court has broad discretion in granting or 
denying Motions to Produce. State v. Lack, 118 Utah 128, 221 
P.2d 852 (1950). Appellant must show that the trial court 
abused this discretion by denying his motion before its ruling 
-10-
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will be overturned. State v. Oldham, 438 P.2d 275 (Idaho 
1968); State v. Tyler, 466 P.2d 120 (Wash. 1970); State v. 
Lybert, 30 Utah 2d 180, 515 P.2d 441 (1973). 
In an apparent attempt to show that the trial court 
abused its discretion here, appellant quotes a definition of 
discretion given in Carmens v. Slavens, Utah, 546 P.2d 601, 
603 (1976). However, the case is not particularly relevant in 
this matter, as demonstrated by the final sentence in the 
paragraph appellant quotes, which appellant failed to include: 
It has always been the policy of our law 
to resolve doubts in favor of permitting 
parties to have their day in court on the 
merits of a controversy (emphasis added). 
This Court was referring to the trial court's failure to allow 
the defendant to have a trial, a much more serious matter than 
the denial of a Motion to Produce. 
This Court has defined the meaning of "abuse of 
discretion" in many cases. The judge's actions clearly must 
be inherently unfair so that no reasonable person could adopt 
the court's view. State v. Gerrard, Utah, 584 P.2d 885 
(1978). It must be clear that the court's decision likely 
resulten in an injustice to the defendant. State v. Danker, 
Utah, 599 P.2d 518 (1979). The trial court's determination 
must clearly appear to be error. State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 
2d 129, 499 P.2d 276 (1972). Respondent contends that 
appellant has failed to show an abuse of discretion in this 
case. 
-11-
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There are several ways to analyze whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying appellant's Motion to 
Produce. First, would the evidence have created a reasonable 
doubt of appellant's guilt. State v. Wilder, 22 Ariz. App. 
541, 529 P.2d 253 (1974). In this case, appellant was 
apprehended when driving a stolen vehicle. The license plates 
were stolen from another vehicle belonging to one of 
appellant's relatives (T. 64, 65). While it is true the 
serial number from the car door did not match the 
registration, appellant knew that this alleged conflict 
existed without examining the car. He was able to introduce a 
police officer's testimony at trial affirming that the serial 
number on the door did not match the registration. Thus, he 
was able to use any identification conflict to his advantage 
at trial to attempt to create reasonable doubt of his guilt. 
It was unnecessary for appellant to actually examine the car 
to bolster his apparent but unstated claim that the car was 
not stolen. The alleged conflict was easily explainable 
because the car doors had been replaced; therefore the serial 
number did not match. In fact, appellant surely realized this 
since the copy of the title for the serial number from the car 
door was registered "inactive" (R. 27). An examination of the 
car would have created no more doubt than the testimony of the 
conflict given by an uninteresten witness di~, and thus was 
unnecessary. 
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The second test is whether it was prejudicial or 
unfair to appellant to deny his motion. In State v. Stewart, 
Utah, 544 P.2d 477 (1975), the police erased a tape made 
during a drug sale. Since the defendant denied that there was 
a sale, the fact the tape was erased was immaterial. It was 
not vital to the issue of guilt. In this case, appellant made 
no claim at trial that the car was not stolen, or was not 
owned by Eric Wichgram. In fact, he has made no showing at 
all that the evidence was vital to the issue of guilt or 
material to his case. State v. White, 98 Idaho 781, 572 P.2d 
884 (1977). The owner of the car identified it extensively at 
trial through the custom work he performed on it such as 
mechanical repairs, replacing the seats and doors, and 
installing a stereo system. There was no real noubt that he 
was the owner and that appellant had stolen the automobile, 
thus it was not prejudicial to appellant's case to deny the 
motion. 
The third test requires appellant to establish that 
the evidence would be favorable to him. State v. Ward, 98 
Idaho 571, 569 P.2d 916 (1977); State v. Oliverez, 34 Or. App. 
417, 578 P.2d 502 (1978). In State v. Koennecke, 545 P.2d 127 
(Or. 1976), defendant was charged with attempted murder for 
firing a gun at a police officer. His defense was that a 
second officer at the scene was the person firing at the 
officer. The court denied his motion for discovery of the 
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officer's guns because the defendant failed to show that 
testing of the revolvers would disclose any favorable 
evidence. In this case, too, appellant has failed to show how 
an examination of the car would produce evidence favorable to 
him. Also, any potential probative value in examining the car 
was far outweighed by the burden of producing the car, then in 
Maryland. 
Appellant further contenos that the trial court 
erred in not granting appellant's Motion to Dismiss. Again, 
appellant is relying on the fact that the serial number on the 
car door dirl not match the registration. Respondent contends 
that appellant's Motion to Dismiss was properly denied. 
states: 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-404 (1953), as amended, 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 
In this case, the state proved the requisite elements of 
theft. Appellant cites State v. Hall, 105 Utah 162, 145 P.2d 
494 (1944), in which this Court states that the goods found in 
defendant's possession must be identified as the goods stolen. 
In that case, which involved the theft of some cases of spark 
plugs, the state had failed to show that the spark plugs in 
defendant's possession were the ones which were stolen. In 
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the present case, the state dio prove that the car in 
defendant's possession was "the property of another" and was 
stolen. The state proved this through the registration and 
insurance cards found in the vehicle, the owner's extensive 
testimony, photographs of the vehicle, and the fact that 
appellant did not claim to own the car at trial. It was not 
necessary that the state actually prove who owned the car. In 
State v. Simmons, Utah, 573 P.2d 341, 343 (1977), this Court 
remarked that the Utah theft statute: 
does not require the state to conclusively 
prove who owned the property in question, 
only that the accused obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the 
property of another. 
Ownership proof is simply not an element that the state must 
prove. The trial court merely left the alleged weakness in 
identification evidence to the jury to be a factor in creating 
any possible reasonable doubt. State v. Buckley, 557 P.2d 283 
(Montana 1976). 
Further, appellant has not challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. He did 
not present any defense. Thus it is difficult to see how an 
examination of the car would have aided in his case. State v. 
Ambrose, Utah, No. 16148, decided February 7, 1980 
(unreported). 
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Finally, appellant claims that his proposed Jury 
instruction number 3 should have been given; however, 
appellant failed to include it in the record designated on 
appeal, as required by Rule 76(a)(l), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P.2d 
154 (1963), this Court held that when the record is devoid of 
evidence, it is assumed that the court below found a 
sufficient basis to support and iustify its findings. Thus, 
it can be assumed the trial court correctly refused to give 
appellant's requested jury instruction. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT RECEIVED A SPEEDY TRIAL AND 
PRELIMINARY HEARING WITHIN THE ST.~TUTORY 
REQUIREMENT. 
In Point III of his brief, appellant contends he did 
not receive a speedy trial, as required by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967). However, the 
Supreme Court has not set a specific time limit in determining 
when a defendant has not had a speedy trial. Barker v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 514 (1972). The Utah Legislature, in Utah Code Ann., 
§ 77-l-6(h), has set a time limit requiring that trials must 
be held within thirty days after arraignment "if the business 
of the court permits." 
-16-
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In this particular case, appellant was arrested on 
June 25, 1981. His trial was held on October 10, 1981. 
Appellant waived his original preliminary hearing in Justice 
of the Peace Court on July 17 (R. 1). At his arraignment in 
District Court on July 28, appellant requested that the case 
be remanded to Justice of the Peace Court for a preliminary 
hearing (R. 18). Again, at appellant's request, the case was 
transferred from the Justice of the Peace Court to the Circuit 
Court for preliminary hearing, which was held within ten days 
after transfer thereto (R. 5). Appellant also filed a Motion 
to Dismiss, in part alleging that he had not received a speedy 
trial. The motion was denied on October 6, 1981; appellant's 
arraignment was held the same day. Appellant's trial date was 
October 15, 1981, nine days after his arraignment and, 
contrary to appellant's contention, well within the thirty-day 
limit set by statute. 
Any pre-trail delay in this case was clearly caused 
by appellant and was for his benefit. He initially waived his 
preliminary hearing and requested that the case be remanded 
for a preliminary hearing; he also requested the transfer to 
Circuit Court. The delay occasioned by the transfers was 
caused in an effort to accommodate appellant and cannot be 
included in computing the time before trial. State v. 
Velasquez, Utah, 641 P.2d 115 (1982)~ State v. Baker, Utah, 
Case No. 17288, decided March 3, 1982 (unreported); Taggard v. 
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State, 500 P.2d 238 (Alaska 1972); State v. English, 594 P.2d 
1069 (Hawaii 1978); Woods v. State, 588 P.2a 1030 (Nevada 
1979); and State v. Cuzze, 225 Kan. 274, 589 P.2d 626 {1979). 
Therefore, the time period between remanding the case for 
preliminary hearing and the arraignment was not an 
unreasonable delay in the proceedings. 
Even the balancing test set forth by the Supreme 
Court in Barker, supra, adopted by this Court in State v. 
Hafen, Utah, 593 P.2d 538 (1979), yields the same result. 
That test includes four factors: the length of the delay, the 
reason therefor, whether defendant asserted his right to a 
speedy trial, and whether the defendant was prejudiced by the 
delay. In Barker, the length of the delay was 5 years; in 
Hafen it was almost 8 months. In those cases, as the present 
one (3-1/2 months' delay), the length of delay was not 
conclusively too long. The reason for the delay, as mentioned 
above, was for appellant's benefit and at his request. 
Appellant did assert his right to a speedy trial--and received 
one within the statutory thirty days; and appellant was not 
prejudiced. He was effectively represented by counsel, as 
discussed in Point I. Also, appellant had no real need to 
examine the stolen automobile, as discussed in Point II, and 
thus the delay did not prejudice him in this respect. 
A factor this Court considers is whether the delay 
was intentionally caused by the prosecutor. If the defendant 
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was not prejudiced and the delay was unintentional, this Court 
has found that the defendant received a speedy trial. State 
v. Rasmussen, 18 Utah 2d 201, 418 P.2d 134 (1966); State v. 
Archuletta, Utah, 577 P.2d 547 (1978). In this case, 
appellant does not contend, ann the record does not reflect 
any intentional delay caused by the state. 
This Court, in Rasmussen, supra, stated that the 
30-day extension is not mandatory. 
be examined in light of its facts. 
Instead, each case shouln 
Since appellant received 
his trial within thirty days after arraignment, was not 
prejudiced by any delay, caused the delay himself, and any 
delay was unintentional, he was not denied a speedy trial. 
The same analysis applies to appellant's allegation 
that he was not given a preliminary hearing until after the 
10-day limit of Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-7(c). As shown above, 
after appellant's requested transfer of the case to the 
Circuit Court, the preliminary hearing was held within the 
ten-day limit (R. 5). Since all the delay up to that point 
was caused by the appellant, he cannot be heard to complain on 
appeal that he was prejudiced by the delay. 
Of course, there is no constitutional right to a 
"speedy preliminary hearing," but merely a statutory 
entitlement to such a hearing, if not waived, within ten days 
of the initial appearance before a committing magistrate if 
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the defendant is in custody. Where this is the case, the 
appellant must clearly establish prejudice in order to prevail 
on his claim. Cf. Crowe v. State, Utah, P.2d (Case 
No. 18227, decined May 25, 1982). In this case, appellant has 
not met this burden and thus his conviction should be 
af firmea. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S AUTOMOBILE WAS PROPERLY 
STOPPED SINCE THE LICENSE PLATES WERE 
STOLEN. 
In Point I of his brief, appellant claims that the 
police officer stopped his car on mere suspicion, which 
violated his constitutional rights. Appellant cites Mallory 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) and Beck v. Ohio, 379 
U.S. 89 (1964) for the proposition that "mere suspicion is not 
sufficient to establish probable cause for a stop despite the 
good intentions of an office." However, appellant's 
application of those cases is incorrect. Both Mallory, supra, 
and Beck, supra, refer to good faith and probable cause when 
arresting someone, not merely stopping someone. 
The Supreme Court, in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648 (1979), set guidelines for police officers when stopping 
automobiles. The officer must have an "articulate and 
reasonable suspicion" that a violation of law exists. In that 
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case, the officer did not suspect the driver of violating any 
law. He stopped the car only because he was not busy at the 
time. The Court felt that the officer violated the driver's 
rights when he stoppeo the automobile without having an 
articulate and reasonable suspicion that the driver had broken 
a law. 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-7-15 also requires an officer 
to have a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or 
will commit an offense before stopping him. The Utah Supreme 
Court, in State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 534, 536 
(1973·), stated a test for reasonableness: 
.•• that is, whether fair-minded 
persons, knowing the facts, and taking 
into consideration not only the rights of 
the individuals involved in the inquiry or 
search, but also the broader interests of 
the public to be protected from crime and 
criminals, would regard the conduct of the 
officers as being unreasonable. 
In that case, police officers received a radio report that a 
robbery had just occurred. Minutes later, the police stoppen 
two men in a car. The court thought the stop was reasonable 
since the car was in the area where the robbery occurred, 
although the report did not contain a description of any 
automobile. 
The courts have heln that police stops are 
reasonable in many situations: when nefendants appeared to be 
casing a shop, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 {1968); when police 
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received a tip that some member of a fa~ily would be making a 
"marijuana run," State v. Ballesteros, 531 P.2 1149 (Ariz. 
1975); when defendant attempted to avoid the officer, State v. 
Baltier, 498 P.2d 515 (Ariz. App. 1972); and when a driver 
appeared to be unfamiliar with his car (although the car had 
not been reported stolen). United States v. Solomon, 528 F.2d 
88 (1975). 
In a recent Utah decision, State v. Elliott, Utah 
626 P.2d 423 (1981), the defendant had attempted to sell tires 
and automobile accessories at very low prices to a service 
station to pay for gasoline. The Court thought the police 
officer was justified in stopping the vehicle although a 
license plate check had revealed that the truck was not 
stolen. In all of these cases, a reasonable suspicion of 
defendant's activity was adequate for the police to make a 
stop. 
In the present case, the officer saw the defendant's 
automobile "coming down the hill at a high rate of speed" (T. 
50). When the officer began to overtake the car, it slowed 
down (T. 50). On these facts alone, the officer was justified 
in stopping the defendant for a speeding violation; but as a 
precaution, the officer checked the license plate to see if 
the car was stolen (T. 50). When the license plate was 
reported as stolen, the officer stopped the vehicle (T. 52, 
5). In this case the officer had even more grounds for 
-2~-4. .. 
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reasonable suspicion than in Torres, supra, where the 
defendants were merely in the vicinity of a robbery, and in 
Elliott, supra, where the license plate was reported as not 
stolen. 
Under these facts, the officer's conduct was clearly 
reasonable in stopping the car. In fact, he would have been 
neglecting his duties as a police officer if he had not 
stopped the automobile bearing stolen license plates. Thus, 
appellant's Motion to Suppress Evidence resulting from the 
stop was properly denied. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
HABEAS CORPUS WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO RAISE A 
SPEEDY TRIAL ISSUE. 
In Point IV of his brief, appellant claims that the 
trial court abused its discretion by denying his petition for 
habeas corpus. In his statement of facts, appellant further 
claims that the trial court held that a motion to dismiss, not 
habeas corpus, was the appropriate method to raise the issue 
of lack of a speedy trial. However, appellant failed to 
designate any portion of the habeas corpus proceedings on 
appeal and therefore it is impossible to ascertain why the 
writ, if any, was denied. 
Assuming appellant did petition for habeas corpus, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring 
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appellant to file a motion to dismiss, rather than habeas 
corpus proceedings. A writ of habeas corpus is used in 
unusual circumstances, as when a court lacks jurisdiction, the 
prosecutor has fabricated evidence, or there is a substantial 
failure of due process. Gallegos v. Turner, 17 Utah 2d 273, 
409 P.2d 386 (1965). 
In Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121, 
122 (1967), this Court discussed habeas corpus, stating: 
The writ is, as our rules describe it, an 
extraordinary writ, to be used to protect 
one who is restrained of his liberty where 
there exists no jurisdiction or authority, 
or where the requirements of the law have 
been so ignored or distorted that the 
party is substantially and effectively 
denied what is included in the term due 
process of law or where some other such 
circumstance exists that it would be 
wholly unconscionable not to re-examine 
the conviction. 
This standard was reiterated with approval in Gentry v. Smith, 
Utah, 600 P.2d 1007 (1979), overruled on other grounds. The 
writ of habeas corpus is to be used "only in circumstances 
which cannot be adequately dealt with by the ordinary rules of 
procedure." Syddall v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 263, 437 P.2d 194 
(1968). 
In this case, habeas corpus was properly denied for 
two reasons. First, appellant fails to claim that the court 
lacked jurisdiction, or that the requirements of law were so 
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distorted that he was substantially and effectively denied due 
process. Second, appellant's claim of lack of speedy trial 
could be adequately dealt with using ordinary procedural 
rules. 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states: 
(a) ••• Where no other plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy exists, relief may be 
obtained by appropriate action under 
these Rules, on any one of the grounds set 
forth in subdivisions (b) and (f) of this 
Rule (emphasis added). 
(Rule 65B(f), cited in appellant's brief on page 10 concerns 
habeas corpus.) 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-25, headed "Dismissal 
without trial," states: 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial 
cause and in furtherance of justice, the 
court may, either on its own initiative or 
upon application of either party, order an 
information or indictment dismissed. 
(b) The Court shall dismiss the 
information or indictment when: 
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitu-
tional delay in bringing defendant at 
trial; 
In this case, a motion to dismiss was the plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy which made habeas corpus inappropriate. 
In other jurisdictions, the courts have also held 
that a motion to dismiss is the correct method of raising a 
speedy trial issue. Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394 
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(1962); People v. Murphy, 212 Ill. 584, 72 N.E. 902 (1904); 
State v. Cuzick, 5 Ariz. App. 498, 428 P.2d 443 (1967); People 
v. Wilson, 32 Cal. Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452 (1963); Application 
of Morris, 369 P.2d 456 (Nevada 1962). 
In Ex Parte Douglas, 95 P.2d 560 (Ariz. 1939), the 
court stated several reasons for requiring a motion to dismiss 
before petitioning for habeas corpus. The motion would be 
made to the court in which the case was pending; that court 
could best ascertain reasons for delay in the proceedings. 
That court could also make a proper record to include in the 
criminal proceedings. Also, a motion to dis~iss is more 
direct, takes less time and is less expensive. 
There are other circumstances, somewhat similar to 
the facts herein, in which habeas corpus is inappropriate. 
Several courts have held that a defendant should file a motion 
to suppress to challenge evidence rather than petitioning for 
habeas corpus when claiming an illegal search. State v. 
Smith, 391 P.2d 849 (Idaho 1964); Dahl v. Sheriff, 553 P.2d 
949 (Nev. 1976); In re Anders, 158 Cal. Rptr. 661, 599 P.2d 
1364 (1979). When a defendant wishes to challenge the bail 
amount set, courts have held it must be done by a motion to 
reduce bond, not by habeas corpus. Petition of Grady, 530 
P.2d 461 (Montana 1974); State v. Dunnan, 223 Kan. 428, 573 
P.2d 1068 (1978). Thus, habeas corpus is not a suitable 
remedy in situations which can be dealt with instead by filing 
a motion. 
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Appellant had no real grounds for habeas corpus 
anyway. He was not denied a speedy trial, as discussed in 
Point III. By improperly attempting to secure habeas corpus 
relief instead of utilizing a motion to oismiss, appellant 
actually caused even more delay before trial. Appellant 
received a hearing on his motion to dismiss based on the same 
claims as in his habeas corpus petition, and the motion was 
denied (R. 20) since appellant caused any delays before trial. 
Either through habeas corpus or a motion to dismiss, the 
result would have been the same since there was no merit in 
appellant's speedy trial claim. Thus, appellant has failed to 
establish any prejudice ano this claim lacks merit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, appellant's conviction 
and sentence should be affirmed. He received effective 
assistance of counsel, he did not need to examine the stolen 
vehicle to prepare his defense, he had a speedy trial, he was 
properly stopped for stolen license plates, and his petition 
for habeas corpus was not a proper method to raise his speedy 
trial issue. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 
1982. 
DAVID L. 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
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